Effi cient Entry in Competing Auctions ∗
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper, we demonstrate the effi ciency of seller entry in a model of competing auctions in which we allow for both buyer and seller heterogeneity. This generalizes existing effi ciency results in the competitive search literature by simultaneously allowing for nonrival (many-on-one) meetings and private information. ∗We thank Andrzej Skrzypacz, our editor, and Jeremy Bulow for their helpful comments. We also thank Xiaoming Cai, who made substantial contributions to the online appendix.
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