& ^ewey Working Paper Alfred P. Sloan School of Management Holding Costs and Equilrerium Arbitrage Holding Costs and Equilrerium Arbitrage Holding Costs and Equilibrium Arbitrage
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper constructs a dynamic model of the equilibrium determination of relative prices when risk averse arbitragers face holding costs. The major fmdings are as follows: 1) Arbitragers reduce but do not eliminate mispricings. 2) Because arbitragers optimally take positions when mispricings are within the riskless arbitrage bounds, models based on riskless arbitrage arguments alone may not provide usefully tight bounds on observed prices. 3) Arbitragers are least effective in eliminating the mispricings of long-term assets. 4) Arbitrage activity is most effective when exogenous shocks are transient and conditionally volatile. 5) Arbitrage activity reduces the conditional volatility of the mispricing process but may increase or decrease its mean reversion. Furthermore, in the presence of arbitragers, both conditional volatility and mean reversion are non-linear functions of the level of
منابع مشابه
.^''^^'^x Ocvt^ Hd28 .m414 Working Paper Alfred P. Sloan School of Management Holding Costs and Equilibrium Arbitrage Holding Costs and Equilibrium Arbitrage Aug 2 7 \ Holding Costs and Equilibrium Arbitrage
In a world were trading is costless, assets with identical cash flows must have identical prices. If arbitrageurs face unit time costs, or holding costs, the prices of these assets need not be equal, i.e the assets can be relatively mispriced. This paper constructs a dynamic model of the equilibrium determination of prices under costly arbitrage. Our analysis reveals that: (i) Mispricing and ar...
متن کاملSynchronization risk and delayed arbitrage
We argue that arbitrage is limited if rational traders face uncertainty about when their peers will exploit a common arbitrage opportunity. This synchronization risk—which is distinct from noise trader risk and fundamental risk—arises in our model because arbitrageurs become sequentially aware of mispricing and they incur holding costs. We show that rational arbitrageurs ‘‘time the market’’ rat...
متن کاملInternational Pricing with Costly Consumer Arbitrage
Consumer arbitrage affects international pricing in several ways. If all consumers face the same arbitrage costs, a monopolist's profit increases with arbitrage costs, and world welfare declines with them (if output does not rise). If arbitrage costs differ across consumers, a monopolist may sell in a second country even if there is no local demand—it can use the second country to discriminate ...
متن کاملCostly Arbitrage and Asset Mispricing: Causal Evidence from Closed-End Funds
We examine how short sale constraints on portfolio holdings affect closed-end fund (CEF) discounts and thereby provide evidence on the causal effect of limits to arbitrage on asset mispricing. Using Regulation SHO as a natural experiment that relaxes shortsale constraints on pilot stocks, we find that discounts of CEFs holding more pilot stocks decrease relative to CEFs holding fewer pilot stoc...
متن کاملOffice of Research Testing Marketing Efficiency using Statistical Arbitrage with Applications to Momentum and Value Strategies
This paper introduces the concept of statistical arbitrage, a long horizon trading opportunity that generates a riskless profit and is designed to exploit persistent anomalies. Statistical arbitrage circumvents the joint hypothesis dilemma of traditional market efficiency tests because its definition is independent of any equilibrium model and its existence is incompatible with market efficienc...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
عنوان ژورنال:
دوره شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2008