A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper we introduce a strategic form model in which cooperation structures and divisions of the payoffs are determined simultaneously. We analyze the cooperation structures and payoff divisions that result according to Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria, and coalition proof Nash equilibria. We find that no cycle will be formed if a player claims a positive amount for the formation of one of its links and that a player does not necessarily profit from a central position in a cooperation structure. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C71, C72. © 2001 Academic Press
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 34 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2001