Negotiating efficient envy-free divisions
نویسندگان
چکیده
Division of a resource among multiple agents is a frequent problem in multiagent systems and fair, efficient, and decentralized allocation procedures are highly valued. A division of a resource or good is envy-free when every agent believes that its share is not less than anyone else’s share by its own estimate. As envy-free procedures are not efficient (in the sense of Pareto optimality) we have previously worked on improving the efficiency of such envy-free division procedures among two agents using models of other agents’ utility functions. In this paper, we extend that work by devising an anytime algorithm that increases the efficiency of the envy-free allocation. The procedure also has the desired property of envy-freeness.
منابع مشابه
Envy-free two-player mm-cake and three-player two-cake divisions
Cloutier, Nyman, and Su (Mathematical Social Sciences 59 (2005), 26–37) initiated the study of envy-free cake-cutting problems involving several cakes. The classical result in this area is that when there are q players and one cake, an envy-free cake-division requiring only q − 1 cuts exists under weak and natural assumptions. Among other results, Cloutier, Nyman, and Su showed that when there ...
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