Justified Belief and the Topology of Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
We introduce a new topological semantics for evidence, evidencebased belief, knowledge and learning. This setting generalizes (and in a sense improves on) the evidence models for belief due to van Benthem and Pacuit, as well as our own previous work on (a topological semantics for) Stalnaker’s doxasticepistemic axioms. We prove completeness, decidability and finite model property for the associated logic, and we look at several types of evidential dynamics.
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