Doxastic Paradoxes without Self-Reference
نویسنده
چکیده
Certain doxastic paradoxes (paradoxes analogous to the Paradox of the Liar but involving ideal belief instead of truth) demonstrate that some formal paradoxes cannot be avoided simply by limiting the expressiveness of one's formal language in order to exclude the very possibility of self-referential thoughts and beliefs. These non-selfreferential paradoxes, moreover, should be of special interest to such investigators of rationality as game theorist, economists and cognitive psychologists, since they occur more frequently in the world beyond the G~deltheorist's laboratory.
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