Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
1 The financial support of NSF 88-09299 and NSF 90-23531 to the first two authors is gratefully acknowledged. We also thank Rachel Croson, Brian Becker, Barry Blecherman, Gerard Cachon, David Goldstein, Teck-Hua Ho, Keith Weigelt, Ben Wilner, and many colleagues at Penn for their work and ideas. We also have received helpful comments from several referees and seminar participants at many universities including Harvard, Cornell, New York University, Penn State, Rochester, Toronto, Minnesota, MIT, and the International Conference on Game Theory (Florence) and BoWo IV (Bonn). Eric J. Johnson
منابع مشابه
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Detecting Failures of Backward Induction: Monitoring Information Search in Sequential Bargaining
We ran three-round sequential bargaining experiments in which the perfect equilibrium o er was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. Subjects o ered $2.11 to other subjects, $1.84 to \robot" players (who are known to play subgame perfectly), and $1.22 to robots after instruction in backward induction. Measures of information search showed that subjects did not look at the amounts being divided in...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 104 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002