The rights egalitarian solution for NTU sharing problems

نویسندگان

  • Carmen Herrero
  • Antonio Villar
چکیده

The purpose of this paper is to extend the Rights Egalitarian solution (Herrero, Maschler & Villar, 1999) to the context of nontransferable utility sharing problems. Such an extension is not unique. Depending on the kind of properties we want to preserve we obtain two di¤erent generalizations. One is the "proportional solution", that corresponds to the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution for surplus sharing problems and the solution in Herrero (1998) for rationing problems. The other is the "Nash solution", that corresponds to the standard Nash bargaining solution for surplus sharing problems and the Nash rationing solution (Mariotti & Villar (2005)) for the case of rationing problems. Key words: sharing problems, rights egalitarian solution, NTU problems JEL classi…cation numbers: D11, D81 Acknowledgement 1 Carmen Herrero acknowledges …nancial support from the Spanish Ministry of Research and Innovation, under Proyect SEJ2007-62656.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Axiomatizing the Harsanyi solution, the symmetric egalitarian solution and the consistent solution for NTU-games

The validity of the axiomatization of the Harsanyi solution for NTU-games by Hart (1985) is shown to depend on the regularity conditions imposed on games. Following this observation, we propose two related axiomatic characterizations, one of the symmetric egalitarian solution (Kalai and Samet, 1985) and one of the consistent solution (Maschler and Owen, 1992). The three axiomatic results are st...

متن کامل

Weighted values and the core in NTU games

The purpose of this paper is to extend the following result by Monderer et al. (1992): the set of weighted Shapley values includes the Core in TU games. We extend the result to the class of uniformly positively smooth NTU games. We focus on two solution concepts which extend the weighted Shapley value. First, we focus on the weighted Egalitarian solution introduced by Kalai and Samet (1985). We...

متن کامل

The MC-value for monotonic NTU-games

The MC-value is introduced as a new single-valued solution concept for monotonic NTU-games. The MC-value is based on marginal vectors, which aze extensions of the well-known marginal vectors for TU-games and hyperplane games. As a result of the definition it follows that the MC-value coincides with the Shapley value for TU-games and with the consistent Shapley value for hyperplane games. It is ...

متن کامل

Sharing the cost of a network: core and core allocations

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained e...

متن کامل

Individual rights and collective responsibility: the rights–egalitarian solution

The problem of distributing a given amount of a divisible good among a set of agents which may have individual entitlements is considered here. A solution to this problem, called the Rights–Egalitarian Solution is proposed. This allocation rule divides equally among the agents the difference between the aggregate entitlements and the amount of the good available. A relevant feature of the analy...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Int. J. Game Theory

دوره 39  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010