Mind as a Layered Network of Natural Computational Processes

Talking about models of cognition, the very mention of “computationalism” often incites reactions against the insufficiency of the Turing machine model, its abstractness and determinism and lack of naturalist foundations, triviality and absence of clarity. None of those objections necessarily undermines viability of models based on natural computation or computing nature where the model of computation is broader than symbol manipulation or conventional models of computation. Computing nature consists of physical structures that form levels of organization, on which computation processes differ, from quantum up to macroscopic levels and back. It is argued here that on the lower levels of information processing in the brain finite automata or Turing machines may still be adequate models, while on the higher level of the whole-brain information processing new natural computing models are necessary. A layered computational architecture based on intrinsic computing of physical systems thus avoids objections against early versions of computationalism. Critique of Classical Computationalism and New Understanding of Computation Historically, computationalism has been accused of many sins (Scheutz, 2002) (Sprevak, 2012) (Miłkowski, 2013). In what follows I would like to answer the following three concerns about computationalism of Mark Sprevak: (R1) Lack of clarity: “Ultimately, the foundations of our sciences should be clear.” Computationalism is suspected to lack clarity. (R2) Triviality: “(O)ur conventional understanding of the notion of computational implementation is threatened by triviality arguments.” Computationalism is accused of triviality. (R3) Lack of naturalistic foundations: “The ultimate aim of cognitive science is to offer, not just any explanation of mental phenomena, but a naturalistic explanation of the mind.” Computationalism is questioned for being formal and unnatural. (Sprevak, 2012) p. 108. Sprevak concludes that meeting all three above expectations of computational implementation is hard. As an illustration of the problems with computationalist approaches to mind, he presents David Chalmers computational formalism of combinatorial state automata and concludes that “Chalmers’ account provides the best attempt to do so [i.e. to meet the above criticism], but even his proposal falls short.” In order to be fully appreciated, Chalmers account, I will argue, should be seen from the perspective of intrinsic, natural computation instead of the a conventional designed computer. Chalmers contends: