From a Verified Kernel towards Verified Systems
نویسنده
چکیده
The L4.verified project has produced a formal, machinechecked Isabelle/HOL proof that the C code of the seL4 OS microkernel correctly implements its abstract implementation. This paper briefly summarises the proof, its main implications and assumptions, reports on the experience in conducting such a large-scale verification, and finally lays out a vision how this formally verified kernel may be used for gaining formal, code-level assurance about safety and security properties of systems on the order of a million lines of code.
منابع مشابه
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