The Introspectibility of BrainStates as Such PETE

Is the Introspection Thesis true? It certainly isn’t obvious. Introspection is the faculty by which each of us has access to his or her own mental states. Even if we were to suppose that mental states are identical to brain states, it doesn’t follow immediately from this supposition that we can introspect our mental states as brain states. This point is analogous to the following. It doesn’t follow immediately from the mere fact that some distant object is identical to a horse that we can perceive it as a horse. Further, it isn’t obvious that any amount of education would suffice to make some distant speck on the horizon seem like a horse. It may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that some distant speck is a horse; as long as we are sufficiently distant from it we will only be able to see it as a speck. Analogously then, it may very well be the case that no matter how well we know that our mental states are brain states, we will only be able to introspect them as irreducibly mental. Not only is the introspection thesis not obviously true, it is not obvious what it would be like for it to be true. We can easily imagine seeing a horse as a horse. Can we similarly imagine introspecting brain states as brain states? I think, indeed, we can. Though I think the case will be even clearer once we review Churchland’s arguments, it will be useful, at this early stage, to get a sketch of what it is we are supposed to imagine. It helps to begin by noting the distinction between something that can be perceived and something that can be figured out based on what is perceived. If I stick my finger into a hot cup of coffee, I can perceive the heat of the coffee. If, without touching the coffee, I see the steam rising from it, it is the steam that I see and based on what I perceive, I figure out the approximate temperature