Stock Market Reactions to Executive Oaths:
نویسندگان
چکیده
Responding to the recent accounting scandals, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) required chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) of large publicly traded companies to swear by their financial statements. Focusing on executive oaths that were filed by the first deadline of August 14, 2002, this study finds that stock markets, on average, reacted positively to executive oaths. Further, this study finds that CEO backgrounds, such as shareholding, external directorships, and association with the firm’s prior financial restatements are significantly related to the abnormal stock returns.
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تاریخ انتشار 2006