From Nash to Dependency Equilibria
نویسنده
چکیده
As is well known, Nash equilibria assume the causal independence of the decisions and the actions of the players. While the independence of the actions is constitutive of normal form games, the independence of the decisions may and should be given up. This leads to the wider and quite different notion of a dependency equilibrium; e.g., cooperation in the single-shot prisoners’ dilemma is a dependency equilibrium. The paper argues this notion to be meaningful and significant and sketches some of its consequences.
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