Cooperation in a sequential N-person prisoner’s dilemma: The role of information and reciprocity

نویسندگان

  • Jana Vyrastekova
  • Yukihiko Funaki
چکیده

We investigate experimentally the possibility of cooperation in a sequential prisoners' dilemma game under the conditions identified by Nishihara (1997). He shows for (a subclass of) n-person prisoners' dilemma games that when players move sequentially, but the order of moves is not known, full cooperation can be attained in a Nash equilibrium under an information structure allowing for trigger strategies. In our experiments, we find that subjects do not coordinate frequently on the payoff dominant equilibrium identified by Nishihara. Moreover, cooperation is more frequent in the same sequential game played with a known order of moves. We relate this theoretically contraintuitive observation to the role of reciprocity. Please send all comments to Jana Vyrastekova, Radboud University Nimegen, Department of Economics, PO Box 9108, 6500 HK Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Tel: +31-24-361 1588, Fax: ++31-24-361 2379, E-mail: [email protected]. Yukihiko Funaki: Waseda University, School of Political Economy and Economics, Tokyo, Japan.

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تاریخ انتشار 2010