Intergovernmental treaty secretariats and policy implementation: what role for bureaucracy?

Embedded in a larger qualitative research framework on organizational effectiveness, this paper explores the role of small treaty secretariats—conceptualised as a distinct type of intergovernmental organizations—in international politics. Although the relevance of bureaucratic actors in international negotiations and regime implementation has been acknowledged by a number of scholars, IR research still lacks theoretical distinction and empirical scrutiny in understanding just when and how intergovernmental organizations affect the behaviour of other actors—both public and private—in the international arena. Theoretically and methodologically, the paper employs organizational theories and sociological institutionalism for qualitative case study research. Empirically, the research traces variances at the outcome level of two environmental treaty secretariats, the secretariat to the Vienna Convention and the Montreal Protocol (“Ozone Secretariat”) and the secretariat to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (“Desertification Secretariat”). While the organizational design of both secretariats is similar, their institutional histories and outcomes differ markedly. Notably, the Ozone Secretariat is part of what is considered a swiftly implemented and largely effective environmental regime, whereas the Desertification Secretariat has only recently been set-up to complement a regime that took almost two decades from its agenda setting stage to the ratification of a substantive international convention. Looking for possible explanations for different outcomes this paper focuses on the activities of both secretariats and how they relate to the authority these secretariats enjoy vis-à-vis the parties they serve. Intergovernmental Treaty Secretariats and Policy Implementation 4