Truth-Revealing Mechanisms for Courts
نویسندگان
چکیده
In trials witnesses often slant their testimony in order to advance their own interests. To obtain truthful testimony, the law relies on cross-examination under threat of prosecution for perjury. We show that perjury law is an imperfect truth-revealing mechanism. More importantly, we develop a perfect truth-revealing mechanism. Under this mechanism the witness is sanctioned if a court eventually finds that the testimony was incorrect; the court need not determine that testimony was dishonest. We explain how truth-revealing mechanisms could combat distortions of observations by factual witnesses and exaggerations by experts, including “junk science.” Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D82, K41, K42.
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Perjury versus Truth-Revelation: Quantity or Quality of Testimony
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