IAEA-SM-367/17/04 Trilateral Initiative: IAEA Authentication and National Certification of Verification Equipment for Facilities with Classified Forms of Fissile Material

Within the framework of the Trilateral Initiative, technical challenges have arisen due to the potential of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) monitoring fissile material with classified characteristics, as well as the IAEA using facilityor host country-supplied monitoring equipment. In monitoring material with classified characteristics, it is recognized that the host country needs to assure that classified information is not made available to the IAEA inspectors. Thus, any monitoring equipment used to monitor material with classified characteristics has to contain information security capabilities, such as information barriers. Conversely, in using host country-supplied monitoring equipment to monitor material, the IAEA has to have confidence that the information provided by the equipment is genuine and can be used to fulfill its obligation to derive conclusions based on independent verification measures. Thus the IAEA needs to go through the process of authenticating the monitoring equipment. In the same way the host country needs to go through the process to assure itself that the monitoring equipment integrated with an information barrier will not divulge any classified information about an inspected sensitive item. To a large extent both processes require identical measures, but partially also may conflict with one another. The fact that monitoring equipment needs to exhibit information security capabilities throughout its life cycle while, at the same time, be capable of being authenticated necessitates the need for creative technical approaches to be pursued.