The \(a\) -serial cost sharing rule

نویسندگان

M. Josune Albizuri

Mikel Álvarez-Mozos

چکیده

A new family of cost sharing rules for cost sharing problems is proposed. This family generalizes the family of α-serial cost sharing rules (Albizuri, 2010) which contains the serial cost sharing rule (Moulin and Shenker, 1992) among others. Every rule of the family is characterized by means of two properties.

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