Marriage and Assortative Matching in Rural Ethiopia
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper examines the determinants of human and physical capital at marriage. Using detailed data from rural Ethiopia, we Þnd ample evidence of assortative matching at marriage. Assets brought to marriage are distributed in a highly unequal manner. Sorting operates at a variety of levels wealth, schooling, and work experience that cannot be summarized into a single additive index. For Þrst unions, assets brought to marriage are positively associated with parents wealth, indicating that a bequest motive affects assets at marriage. Unlike most brides, grooms appear to accumulate individual assets over time and over marriages. The marriage market is a major conduit for rural and gender inequality. ∗Department of Economics, University of Oxford, Manor Road, Oxford OX1 3UL. E-mail: [email protected]. Fax: +44(0)1865-281447. Tel: +44(0)1865-281444. International Food Policy Research Institute, 2033 K Street N.W., Washington DC 20006. Tel.: (202) 862-5650. Email: [email protected].
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