Democracy and Redistribution
نویسنده
چکیده
Boix, Carles. Democracy and redistribution / Carles Boix. p. cm. – (Cambridge studies in comparative politics) Includes bibliographical references and index.
منابع مشابه
The Political Economy of Redistribution under Democracy∗
We ask what redistributions of income and assets are feasible in a democracy, given the initial assets and their distribution. The question is motivated by the possibility that if redistribution is insufficient for the poor or excessive for the rich, they may turn against democracy. In turn, if no redistribution simultaneously satisfies the poor and the wealthy, democracy cannot be sustained. H...
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