Asymmetric Demand Information and Channel Profits When Retailers Compete
نویسندگان
چکیده
We consider a supply chain with a single manufacturer selling a single product through two competing retailers. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price, and the retailers set the retail margin, simultaneously. The demand information among the members is asymmetric. The main contribution of this paper is extended the results of [5] with two competing retailers under asymmetric demand information. We consider six cases with the manufacturer or the retailers whether owning the information or not, and analyze these six cases in turn solve for a Bayesian equilibrium. Some results are obtained finally.
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