Information Aggregation and Large Auctions
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چکیده
We start with the simplest possible model. There are kn objects for sale and n potential buyers. The valuations vi are drawn independently from a common distribution F (vi) for all potential bidders. We assume that F has a continuous density function f . Suppose now that the objects are allocated according to the following rule: kn buyers with the highest bids receive the object and pay the price of the (kn + 1) st highest bid. In case of a tie between the k n and the (kn + 1) st bidder the object is randomly allocated between them.
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