The Initiative Process and the Dynamics of State Interest Group Populations

What effect does the initiative process have on the volatility of interest group populations? Theoretical results suggest that interest group communities in initiative states should be characterized by greater rates of entry and exit since the presence of the initiative process increases mobilizations by potentially less stable groups, particularly broad-based citizen groups. I test this prediction using data on state interest group lobby registrations in 1990 and 1997. Tabular and regression analysis of exit and entry rates for all groups as well as separate analyses for different kinds of groups, including citizen, economic, membership, institutions, and associations are consistent with the prediction, with the effect strongest and most consistent for citizen and membership groups. 1 The Initiative Process and Interest Groups Institutions for direct legislation influence representation and behavior by organized interests. By allowing citizens and organized interests to change policy without direct involvement by the legislature, institutions like the initiative process alter groups’ decisions about whether to mobilize and how to lobby. In particular, the direct initiative process, as opposed to the referendum process has important consequences since it offers citizens and organized interests broad flexibility in designing policy proposals without legislative interference. One important consequence is that the twenty-four U.S. states that permit direct initiatives have more interest groups (Boehmke 2002, 2005a; Smith and Tolbert 2004). Further, the magnitude of this effect is sizable — initiative states have almost thirty percent more groups — and it is particularly large for broad-based citizen groups rather than narrow economic interests. Since citizen groups are those with open memberships that represent the interest of the general public rather than representing a narrow economic interest, this finding is important since it demonstrates that institutions like direct legislation increase representation and representativeness among interest group communities. Yet knowing that the initiative process increases the size of interest group populations does not tell us the whole story. Theories of the initiative process suggest that it should influence not just the size of interest group populations, but also their dynamics. To this point, however, no empirical tests have been brought to bear on the question of how the initiative process alters the dynamics underlying interest group populations. Here, I study this issue by analyzing interest group entry and exit rates across states. Tabular and regression analysis indicates significant increases in both in initiative states, particularly for citizen and membership groups. Further, I demonstrate that