Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We present laboratory experiments of five different multi-unit auction mechanisms. Two units of a homogeneous object were auctioned off among two bidders with flat demand for two units. We test whether expected demand reduction occurs in open and sealed–bid uniform–price auctions. Revenue equivalence is tested for these auctions as well as for the Ausubel, the Vickrey and the discriminatory sealed–bid auction. Furthermore, we compare the five mechanisms with respect to the efficient allocation of the units.
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