An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Pay Auction
نویسنده
چکیده
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players’ signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies; and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater expected revenue than all other other known sealed bid auction forms.
منابع مشابه
An Analysis of the War of Attrition and the All-Play Auction
We study the war of attrition and the all-pay auction when players' signals are affiliated and symmetrically distributed. We (a) find sufficient conditions for the existence of symmetric monotonic equilibrium bidding strategies and (b) examine the performance of these auction forms in terms of the expected revenue accruing to the seller. Under our conditions the war of attrition raises greater ...
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