Amnesia and homicide: the Padola case and a study of thirty cases.

Amnesia, derived from the Greek word meaning forgetfulness,I,2 has come to mean a "loss or lack of memory."2 The importance of this condition needs no emphasis, for it has always been associated with criminal law. St. Augustine's "ream lingum non tacit nisi mens rea" underpins the principle of the English and most other legal systems that a forbidden act (actus reus) and a wicked intent (mens rea) are the twin cornerstones upon which rests responsibility. 6 In the 16th century memory was recognized as a criteria for criminal responsibility. Sir Edward Coke's dicta "there must be a total deprivation of memory and understanding"4 established the ground rules for assessing lack of criminal responsibility. Later, Sir Matthew Hale distinguished between "frenesis" or madness,4 and lesser degrees of mental illness and amnesia became an important criteria in assessing criminal responsibility. The trial of Daniel McNaughten highlighted the importance of cognitive factors in insanity issues, and this emphasis has continued up until recent times. Eliciting amnesia in an offender does not, of course, solely establish a defense of insanity or reduce criminal responsibility. The simple forgetting of an act does not imply that it was committed in a state of altered consciousness, that is automatism, although it may be difficult to differentiate such cases from those with 'psychogenic' amnesia. Such was the issue in English criminal law, in the case of Guenther Padola, where the defense attempted to establish that the accused was unfit to plead on the grounds that he was unable to instruct his counsel due to amnesia for the whole of his past life. 11 In reviewing this case, the authors were struck by the arguments raised at trial as to what constitutes hysterical and malingered amnesia, and a review of these aspects of the case was felt to be warranted. On July 13, 1959,