Strategic Complementarity in Multi-stage Games

Games with strategic complementarities: New applications to industrial organization

This paper provides an introduction to the analysis of games with strategic complementarities and applications to industrial organization: oligopoly pricing, comparative statics and a taxonomy of strategic behavior in two-stage games. D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; L13

Strategic complementarities and nested potential games ∗ Hiroshi Uno

This paper shows that every finite game of weak strategic complementarities is a nested pseudo-potential game if the action set of one player is multi-dimensional and the action sets of the others are one-dimensional; the implication does not hold, however, if the action sets of more than two players are multi-dimensional. Moreover, the paper proposes a new class of games of nested strategic co...

Cooperation in experimental games of strategic complements and substitutes

We conduct a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player games with a Paretoinefficient Nash equilibrium. We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in the case of strategic substitutes.

(Appendix to: When Promoters Like Scalpers) Global strategic complementarity in a global games setting

Strategic complementarity and substitutability without transitive indifference

We study what useful implications strategic complementarity or substitutability may have when the indifference relation(s) need not be transitive. Two results are obtained about the existence of a monotone selection from the best response correspondence when both strategies and parameters form chains. Two more results are obtained about the existence of a Nash equilibrium in games with strategi...