Signaling quality through prices in an oligopoly
نویسندگان
چکیده
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product is private information (not known to consumers or to other firms), we show that there exist fully revealing equilibria in mixed strategies. In such equilibria, low quality firms enjoy market power when other firms are of high quality. High quality firms charge higher prices than low quality firms but lose business to rival firms with higher probability. Some of the revealing equilibria involve high degree of market power (price close to full information monopoly level) while others are more "competitive". Under certain conditions, if the number of firms is large enough, information is revealed in every equilibrium. JEL Classification: L13, L15, D82, D43. Key-words: Signaling; Quality; Oligopoly; Incomplete Information. ∗We thank Andrew Daughety and Jennifer Reinganum for insightful comments. †Department of Economics, Erasmus University, Rotterdam, P.O. Box 1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. Tel: (+31)-10-4082341; E-mail: [email protected]. ‡Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, 3300 Dyer Street, Dallas, TX 75275-0496. Tel: 214 768 2714; E-mail: [email protected].
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 68 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010