Range Authentication Protocols for Localization

A distance bounding protocol is a type of challenge-response protocol used to measure the distance of a responder (or prover) from an initiator (or verifier). The advantage of the protocol is that, assuming that the prover does not collude with anybody else, he cannot make himself appear any closer than he is. If he colludes with somebody else, he can only appear as close as his cohort. Distance bounding protocols were originally proposed for the verification of proximity. More recently, they, and a similar type of protocol with somewhat different trust assumptions, the authenticated ranging protocol, have been proposed for secure localization in sensor networks. Many localization techniques relay on collecting ranging measurements, and distance bounding and authenticated ranging provide a means of doing this a degree of security. However, the security obtained is not perfect, as we shall see, and the trust assumptions must be considered carefully when deciding how to use them. In this work we concentrate on the application of distance bounding and authenticated ranging to secure localization. We are interested in the case in which only part of the network (perhaps restricted to one geographical portion of the network) knows its location, and location information must be propagated securely to other parts of the network. We are interested in questions like such as the following: How is a node able to determine that another node may be lying about its location? Does it make sense to try to authenticate ranging information of even nodes that lie, or at somewhat less cost, only try to authenticate ranging information of honest nodes? How can we best employ different techniques for securing ranging information? The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with a survey of distance bounding and range authentication protocols, paying particular