Excellent Arguments on Functionalism from the Philosophy Forum, 7/2004

Quote: Originally Posted by TecnoTut Functionalism, whether it be machine functionalism, teleofunctionalism, or just plain old fashioned functionalism, merely describes what mental properties do, not what mental properties are ... Although functionalists associate themselves with materialistic monism (that is, the view that only material things exist), there is a dualism lurking beneath the surface. For, since any given mental state cannot be reduced to the physical mechanism which produces it (whether neurological or silicon-based), then mental states must be something more than the merely physical. it makes no sense to claim that because "walking" is not reducible to "legs" the act / process of "walking" must be nonphysical. if "mind" is (only?) what "brains" do (and i'm not aware of any coherent argument or evidence to the contrary), then likewise the implication that "mind" is nonphysical is unwarranted (except, of course, as idle metaphysical speculation). though these complementary aspects (mind-brain) are not reducible to one other, it doesn't follow that these disparate aspects entail wholly distinct or incommensurable ontologies. the 'dualism' you perceive in "materialistic monism", tecno , seems the 'dualism' you're looking for. 180