Licensing of a Drastic Innovation with Product Differentiation
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze the licensing of a drastic innovation when products are differentiated due to consumer and/or product heterogeneity. We show that an industry insider prefers to divest its production arm and license the new technology as an industry outsider, in which case it can replicate multiproduct monopoly profits. We derive the optimal contracts and the optimal number of licenses by assuming a logit demand system. Optimal number of licenses, quite strikingly, increases when the technology has a higher relative value than a commercialized alternative. This result stands in sharp contrast with the literature on the licensing of a homogenous good.
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