Property Versus Contract.∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
There is a fundamental trade-off between protecting property rights and enhancing reliance on contracts when intermediaries have the opportunity to transfer goods without the owner’s consent. If buyers value the good more than original owners, protection of property misallocates value. Instead, enhancing the buyers’ reliance on contracts causes misallocation if owners have the higher valuation. Our model shows that protection of property rises with the strength of a culture of morality and falls with the quality of the legal system. This is consistent with instrumental variables estimates based on a novel dataset measuring the wide legal variation existing in 77 jurisdictions.
منابع مشابه
Cooperative Benefit and Cost Games under Fairness Concerns
Solution concepts in cooperative games are based on either cost games or benefit games. Although cost games and benefit games are strategically equivalent, that is not the case in general for solution concepts. Motivated by this important observation, a new property called invariance property with respect to benefit/cost allocation is introduced in this paper. Since such a property can be regar...
متن کاملSpecific Performance versus Damages for Breach of Contract
When would parties to a contract want performance to be specifically required, and when would they prefer payment of money damages to be the remedy for breach? This fundamental question is studied here, and an answer is provided that is based on a simple distinction between contracts to produce goods and contracts to convey property. Setting aside qualifications, the conclusion for breach of co...
متن کاملCollateral as Signal Variable in a Business Partnership Contract: A Case Study of Refah Kargaran Bank
There is no convergence in the results of the credit relationship between the financial contracting parties (banks and customers) due to the different importance of the contract variables. Therefore, while examining the impact of the empirical relationship between the variables commercial profit-loss sharing contracts, the dual role of the collateral variable (screening and motivation) is in...
متن کاملقراردادهای نشر در حقوق ایران
Authors have some economic rights that are assignable. In many cases assignment of these rights is done by contract, but Iranian legislator don’t insert any article about this subject in 1969 ACT. This gap causes some practical problems, Although general principals in contract law have complementary role in this respect but as intellectual property right have specific nature, it is necess...
متن کاملProperty Rights , Firm Boundaries , and R & D Inputs
This Article offers an explanation of the role of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in information-intensive vertical supply relationships. In particular, we explore the connection between stronger property rights and the enhanced viability of independent (versus vertically integrated) input supply firms when contracts are incomplete. We start by modeling a tradeoff between two types of infor...
متن کامل