Robust Predictions in Infinite-horizon Gamesan Unrefinable Folk Theorem

A Structure Theorem for Rationalizability in Infinite-horizon Games

We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is rationalizable for a type ti, then there are perturbations of ti for which following ai for an arbitrarily long future is the only rationalizable plan. One can pick the perturbation from a finite type space with common prior. Furthermore, if ai is part of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the perturbation can be picke...

Convergence of trajectories in infinite horizon optimization

In this paper, we investigate the convergence of a sequence of minimizing trajectories in infinite horizon optimization problems. The convergence is considered in the sense of ideals and their particular case called the statistical convergence. The optimality is defined as a total cost over the infinite horizon.

Stochastic Games with Hidden States∗

This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. Public randomization is available. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. We also provide a recursive charac...

Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for the Perfect Finite Horizon Folk Theorem

A Robust Folk Theorem for the Prisoner's Dilemma

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner’s dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomiz...