Projections and Functions of Nash Equilbria Preliminary Draft - Not For Circulation
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that any compact semi-algebraic subset of mixed action profiles on a fixed player set can be represented as the projection of the set of equilibria of a game in which additional binary players have been added. Even stronger, we show that any semi-algebraic continuous function, or even any semi-algebraic upper-semicontinuous correspondence with nonempty values, from a bounded semi-algebraic set to the unit cube can be represented as the projection of an equilibrium correspondence of a game with binary players in which payoffs depend on parameters from domain of the function or correspondence in a multilinear way.
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