Contracting in Vague Environments∗
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper investigates the implications for contracting problems with adverse selection of assuming a more general information structure than usual. The paper applies a choice theoretic framework introduced in Olszewski (2007) and Ahn (2008) a special case of the vague environments in Vierø (2009a) to a canonical principal-agent model with hidden information. The vague environment reflects that in many real-world contracting situations information is imprecise, and it gives rise to interesting effects. The intuition and mechanism behind the optimal contract fundamentally changes and so does the optimal contract. The results can, for example, explain patterns observed in franchising.
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