On strategic stability in discontinuous games
نویسنده
چکیده
We identify a class of discontinuous normal-form gameswhosemembers possess strategically stable sets, defined according to an infinite-game extension of Kohlberg and Mertens’s (1986) equilibrium concept, and show that, generically, a set is stable if and only if it contains a single Nash equilibrium. © 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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