A uniform price auction with locational price adjustments for competitive electricity markets

نویسندگان

  • Robert Ethier
  • Ray Zimmerman
  • Timothy Mount
  • William Schulze
  • Robert Thomas
چکیده

Competitive electricity markets which rely on centralized dispatch require a mechanism to solicit offers from competing generators. Ideally, such an auction mechanism provides incentives to submit offers equal to the marginal cost of generation for each generator. Economic theory suggests that the Uniform Price auction is an appropriate institution. However, an efficient implementation of this auction in an electricity context requires that the offers used in the auction reflect the appropriate locational price adjustments for transmission losses and congestion. This paper describes a uniform price auction that incorporates locational price adjustments on a Web-based platform suitable for experimentation. Preliminary results show dramatically different price and revenue results when compared with a simple continuous Discriminative auction. q 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Pii: S0142-0615(98)00034-9

Competitive electricity markets which rely on centralized dispatch require a mechanism to solicit offers from competing generators. Ideally, such an auction mechanism provides incentives to submit offers equal to the marginal cost of generation for each generator. Economic theory suggests that the Uniform Price auction is an appropriate institution. However, an efficient implementation of this ...

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تاریخ انتشار 1999