Automated Reasoning in Social Choice Theory: Some Remarks
نویسندگان
چکیده
Our objective in this note is to comment briefly on the newly emerging literature on computer-aided proofs in Social Choice Theory. We shall specifically comment on [16] (henceforth TL) and [4] (henceforth GE). In the Appendix we provide statements and brief descriptions of the results discussed in this note. Mathematics Subject Classification (2000). Primary (91B14,68T15); Secondary (03B35).
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematics in Computer Science
دوره 8 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014