Reputational cheap talk∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper analyzes information reporting by a privately informed expert concerned about being perceived to have accurate information. When the expert’s reputation is updated on the basis of the report as well as the realized state, the expert typically does not wish to truthfully reveal the signal observed. The incentives to deviate from truthtelling are characterized and shown to depend on the information structure. In equilibrium, experts can credibly communicate only part of their information. Our results also hold when experts have private information about their own accuracy and care about their reputation relative to others.
منابع مشابه
Supplementary Material on Reputational Cheap Talk
In Ottaviani and Sørensen, henceforth OS, (2004b), we have formulated a model of strategic communication by an expert concerned about being perceived to be well informed. In that model, the expert observes a private signal informative about the state of the world. The amount of information about the state contained in this signal is parametrized by the expert's ability, assumed for simplicity t...
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