Market Discipline of Bank Risk: Theory and Evidence
نویسندگان
چکیده
ECAUSE of the many failures of banks and thrift institutions in recent years and the high cost of liquidating or reorganizing the bankrupt savings and loan associations, policymakers are now considering major changes in the way they supervise and regulate depository institutions in the United States. The Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, which provides the funds for closing bankrupt savings and loan associations (S&.Ls), calls for several government agencies to study the issues involved.1 The federal budget document for fiscal 1991 discusses the basis for reform of deposit insurance and the advantages of various reforms.2
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