(Anti)Realist Implications of a Pragmatist Dual-Process Active-Externalist Theory of Experience

Realism/antirealism issues are considered in light of a pragmatist philosophy of mind. A pragmatist philosophy of mind is cast in terms of a dual-process active-externalist theory of experience. This theory posits two kinds of experience such that mentality (as a capacity for thinking, hypothesizing, theorizing, reasoning, deliberating) constitutes one of the two kinds of experience. The formal correspondence of theory with facts is characterized in terms of a functional correspondence between these two kinds of experience. Realist and constructivist aspects of this view are then discussed. Activeexternalism guarantees a kind of ecological realism that allows the theory to avoid radical constructivism or irrealism. The pragmatist philosophy of mind outlined in the first half of this paper is designed to shed light on what William James and John Dewey were concerned with a century ago in their wholesale rejection of traditional epistemology and metaphysics. What they took to be a viable alternative, if comprehensible at all, may seem irrelevant if not entirely Philosophia Scientiæ, 12 (1), 2008, 187–211.