Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
نویسندگان
چکیده
Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have each been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and non-cooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C91, D52, D64) How can cooperation persist in the absence of enforceable performance contracts? With infinitely-lived relationships, cooperation can emerge when the long-term cost of damaging a valuable relationship outweighs the immediate benefit of poor performance (see, for ex-
منابع مشابه
Appendix to Accompany: Group Reputations, Stereotypes, and Cooperation in a Repeated Labor Market
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