An Estimated Model of Risk Analysis of Attacks on Smart Card Authentication Schemes

With the rapid growth of computer networks, more and more users access the remote server’s service in a distributed computing environment. Due to the fast development of the Internet and wireless communications, many activities like online-shopping, online banking, online voting are conducted over it. Authentication is one of the essential security features of network communication. The authentication process ascertains the legitimacy of the communicating partners in communication. In the authentication procedure, the promoter of the communication and the defendant derives some identification codes of each other prior to start of the message transaction. Sundry methods have been introduced regarding the authentication process from time to time. The static approach authentication schemes are vulnerable to different types of attacks. The growth of smart card systems faces security threats to both the card and its environment. Issues related to readers, protocol implementations, the smart card’s hardware security features or a combination of logical and physical attacks is of legitimate concern. All the elements of a smart card system have their own specific behavior. They could be attacked in various ways. In this paper we analyze the smart card attacks through a noncyclic attack graph. Noncyclic attack graphs provide an intuitive aid in threat analysis. We dissert that such a formal interpretation is indispensable to precisely understand how noncyclic attack graphs can be framed up during design and analysis. We provide an educational semantics, based on a mapping to attack stack, which abstracts from the internal structure of a Noncyclic attack graph, we study transformations between Noncyclic attack graphs, and we study the attribution and the projection of a Noncyclic attack graph. General Terms: Smart Card, Attack Graph, Security.