Revenue comparisons for auctions when bidders have arbitrary types
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions when bidders’ types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be multidimensional, and there may be mass points in the distribution. One application extends existing revenue equivalence results. Another application shows that first-price auctions yield higher expected revenue than second-price auctions when bidders are risk averse and face financial constraints. This revenue ranking extends to risk-averse bidders with general forms of nonexpected utility preferences.
منابع مشابه
Approximately Optimal Auction when Bidders have Private Budgets
ABSTRACT We tackle the problem of designing revenue maximizing auctions in the Bayesian framework, when bidders not only have private valuations but also private budgets. We consider the setting of selling divisible goods to multiple agents each with linear utilities, but agents cannot pay beyond their budget. We focus on the case when the auctioneer can check that bidders do not over-report th...
متن کاملRevenue monotonicity in deterministic, dominant-strategy combinatorial auctions
In combinatorial auctions using VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders. In this paper we investigate the extent to which this counter-intuitive phenomenon can also occur under other deterministic dominant-strategy combinatorial auction mechanisms. Our main result is that such failures of “revenue monotonicity” can occur under any such mechanism that is weakly maximal—m...
متن کاملSpiteful Bidding in Sealed-Bid Auctions
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize the weighted difference of their own profit and their competitors’ profit. This assumption is motivated by inherent spitefulness, or, for example, by competitive scenarios such as in closed markets where the loss of a competitor will likely result in future gains for oneself. We der...
متن کاملWinner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions using Hybrid Ant Colony Optimization and Multi-Neighborhood Local Search
A combinatorial auction is an auction where the bidders have the choice to bid on bundles of items. The WDP in combinatorial auctions is the problem of finding winning bids that maximize the auctioneer’s revenue under the constraint that each item can be allocated to at most one bidder. The WDP is known as an NP-hard problem with practical applications like electronic commerce, production manag...
متن کاملEfficiency Through Revenue Redistribution in Auctions with Entry
We consider a single-item private values auction setting with endogenous costly entry. We demonstrate that for symmetric bidders and entry costs that are an arbitrary linear function of value, a unique symmetric Bayes-Nash “cutoff equilibrium” (where only agents with value above some threshold enter) obtains under the Vickrey auction and also a broader class of revenue-redistributing auctions. ...
متن کامل