When concepts lose their color: a case of object-color knowledge impairment.

Color is important in our daily interactions with objects, and plays a role in both low- and high-level visual processing. Previous neuropsychological studies have shown that color perception and object-color knowledge can doubly dissociate, and that both can dissociate from processing of object form. We present a case study of an individual who displayed an impairment for knowledge of the typical colors of objects, with preserved color perception and color naming. Our case also presented with a pattern of, if anything, worse performance for naming living items compared to non-living things. The findings of the experimental investigation are evaluated in light of two theories of conceptual organization in the brain: the Sensory/Functional Theory and the Domain-Specific Hypothesis. The dissociations observed in this case compel a model in which sensory/motor modality and semantic domain jointly constrain the organization of object knowledge.