Preserving or removing special players: What keeps your payoff unchanged in TU-games?

نویسندگان

  • Sylvain Béal
  • Eric Rémila
  • Philippe Solal
چکیده

If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo [9]. We introduce axioms of invariance from player deletion in presence of a special player. In particular, if the special player is a nullifying player (resp. dummifying player), then the equal division value (resp. equal surplus division value) is characterized by the associated axiom of invariance plus efficiency and balanced cycle contributions. There is no type of special player from such a combination of axioms that characterizes the Shapley value.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The Maximal Payoff and Coalition Formation in Coalitional Games *

This paper first establishes a new core theorem using the concept of generated payoffs: the TU (transferable utility) core is empty if and only if the maximum of generated payoffs (mgp) is greater than the grand coalition’s payoff v(N), or if and only if it is irrational to split v(N). It then provides answers to the questions of what payoffs to split, how to split the payoff, what coalitions t...

متن کامل

A TRANSITION FROM TWO-PERSON ZERO-SUM GAMES TO COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH FUZZY PAYOFFS

In this paper, we deal with games with fuzzy payoffs. We proved that players who are playing a zero-sum game with fuzzy payoffs against Nature are able to increase their joint payoff, and hence their individual payoffs by cooperating. It is shown that, a cooperative game with the fuzzy characteristic function can be constructed via the optimal game values of the zero-sum games with fuzzy payoff...

متن کامل

Optimal Behavioral Strategies In 0-Sum Games with Almost Perfect Information

This paper provides the general construetion of the optimal strategies in a special class of zero sum games with incomplete information, those in which the players move sequentially. It is shown that at any point of the game tree, a player's optimal behavioral strategy may be derived from a state variable involving two components: the first one keeps track of the information he revealed, the se...

متن کامل

The Compromise Value for Cooperative Games with Random Payoffs

The compromise value is introduced for cooperative games with random payoffs, that is, for cooperative games where the payoff to a coalition of players is a random variable. It is a compromise between utopia payoffs and minimal rights. This solution concept is based on the compromise value for NTU games and the τ -value for TU games. It is shown that the nonempty core of a game is bounded by th...

متن کامل

Distributing dividends in games with ordered players

A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors to every TU-game. Some solutions that are based on distributing dividends are the Shapley value (being the single-valued solution distributing the dividends equally am...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:
  • Mathematical Social Sciences

دوره 73  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2015