Bundling in exchange markets with indivisible goods∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study efficient and individually rational exchange rules for markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods that exclude the possibility that an agent benefits by bundling goods in her endowment. Even if agents’ preferences are additive, no such rule exists. JEL Classification: C71, D63, D71.
منابع مشابه
Welfare and Revenue Guarantees for Competitive Bundling Equilibrium
We study equilibria of markets with m heterogeneous indivisible goods and n consumers withcombinatorial preferences. It is well known that a competitive equilibrium is not guaranteedto exist when valuations are not gross substitutes. Given the widespread use of bundling inreal-life markets, we study its role as a stabilizing and coordinating device by considering thenotion of co...
متن کاملExchange in a general market with indivisible goods
We examine general exchange markets with heterogenous indivisible goods, where each agent may be endowed with a set of indivisible goods, but there is no divisible good that could be used as a medium of exchange. Thus, our model is a generalization of the Shapley-Scarf housing market model, in which each agent owns one indivisible good. Our main result is a characterization of the set of group-...
متن کاملManipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. W...
متن کاملRental harmony with roommates
We prove existence of envy-free allocations in markets with heterogenous indivisible goods and money, when a given quantity is supplied from each of the goods and agents have unit demands. We depart from most of the previous literature by allowing agents’ preferences over the goods to depend on the entire vector of prices. Our proof uses Shapley’s K-K-M-S theorem and Hall’s marriage lemma. We t...
متن کاملContract design and stability in many-to-many matching
We develop a model of many-to-many matching with contracts which subsumes as special cases many-to-many matching markets and buyer–seller markets with heterogeneous and indivisible goods. In our setting, substitutable preferences are sufficient to guarantee the existence of stable outcomes; moreover, in contrast to results for the setting of many-to-one matching with contracts, if any agent’s p...
متن کامل