On Bounds for Allocation of Seats in the European Parliament
نویسندگان
چکیده
Rules i.–iii. are clear and do not require any comments, but rule iv. may raise some doubts. Although the very notion of degressive proportionality can, in principle, be defined in a mathematically rigorous way, one may construct several different methods of distribution of the seats in the Parliament consistent with this rule. Roughly speaking, degressive proportionality means a conjunction of two conditions:
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تاریخ انتشار 2010