Strategic Choice of Sequencing of Negotiations: A Model with One-Sided Incomplete Information1
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper considers the e¤ect of linkage between bargains that a single buyer has with two suppliers of di¤erent items. The buyers valuation is private information but it is commonly known that one of the items is worth twice as much to the buyer as the other. Each bargain uses the extensive form of Section 5 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1983). We nd that it is optimal for the buyer either to bargain simultaneously or to bargain rst with the less important seller. The gains from sequencing come from being tough with the less important seller. The D1 re nement is modi ed and used to select equilibria in the bargaining game.
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