Algorithm Con guration to Investigate the Price of Anarchy
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چکیده
The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a measure that compares the ratio between the maximum and minimum of a cost function evaluated at any Nash equilibrium of a game. There have been many results that bound the highest PoA for certain classes of games, but little has been done to explore the distribution of the PoA over a set of games. This project proposes a method to empirically evaluate this distribution using automatic algorithm con guration techniques.
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